In May 2024, a Paris court ordered French internet service providers to block DNS resolution for six domains streaming pirated tennis content. By autumn, that list had expanded to 118 entries—without announcement, public registry, or transparent criteria for inclusion. The episode reveals how DNS-level censorship can grow unchecked once judicial machinery begins turning.

Silent Expansion and the Blocklist Problem

Court-ordered DNS blocks are a common enforcement tool in France, Germany, the UK, and other jurisdictions where rights holders seek faster remedies than individual takedown notices. Unlike content removal at the source, DNS blocking operates at the resolver level: your ISP's DNS server simply refuses to answer queries for the target domain, rendering it unreachable to users.

The issue with expanding blocklists is procedural opacity. The initial six-domain order was documented. Subsequent additions appear to have occurred quietly, with no new court filings, public announcements, or opportunity for domain owners to be heard. This creates a two-fold problem: scope creep becomes invisible, and inclusion standards become subjective.

By mid-2024, researchers found that the list now contained expired domains, at least one site seized by the U.S. Government, and domains with no apparent piracy connection. The blocklist had become a legal black hole—once added, domains remained blocked indefinitely, even after seizure or legitimacy.

Collateral Damage and Expired Domain Risk

Expired domains are a particular concern. When a domain registration lapses, it may be re-registered by a new owner months or years later. If that domain remains on a DNS blocklist from its previous life, the new owner inherits censorship without notice or recourse. This is not theoretical: at least one expired domain on the French list was later repurchased by legitimate entities, who found themselves unable to operate their sites in France.

The presence of a seized domain on an active blocklist is equally troubling. Once law enforcement confiscates a domain, further blocking is redundant—the domain either no longer resolves to pirate content, or it belongs to the government. Yet it remained on the list, suggesting no mechanism exists for judicial or administrative removal.

For hosting providers and domain registrars, this creates compliance ambiguity. Should a registrar block renewal of a domain on an unofficial blocklist. Should a host refuse service based on an undocumented court order. The lack of transparency means providers operating in France must either assume all blacklist data is authoritative, or risk legal exposure by serving domains without verifying their status.

The Jurisdiction and Hosting Impact

France is not unique in using DNS blocking; it is relatively mature in its deployment. However, the uncontrolled expansion of such lists—especially without published criteria or removal procedures—creates pressure on infrastructure across borders.

Hosting providers and VPN operators must decide whether to honour undocumented blocklists or challenge them. Some providers in privacy-conscious jurisdictions (such as offshore hosting operations) may refuse to implement filters based on secret court orders, citing lack of due process. Others, particularly large public resolvers, may capitulate to avoid legal friction in major markets.

The presence of Hong Kong servers in the piracy infrastructure initially identified in the case underscores a broader truth: jurisdiction shopping is real, but so is the reach of Western judicial orders through DNS resolver cooperation. A domain hosted in Hong Kong can be unreachable in France if Cloudflare, Quad9, or an ISP's resolver simply stops answering queries for it.

Transparency and Accountability

The core technical issue is that DNS blocking is difficult to audit. Unlike a takedown notice filed with a specific host, or a court order published in a legal registry, DNS blocks operate silently. Users may not realise a domain is blocked; they see a timeout or NXDOMAIN error. ISPs and resolvers have little incentive to publicise censorship lists, especially when they lack clear legal foundation.

For the infrastructure community, this suggests a need for standardised, published blocklist formats and removal procedures. If DNS-level enforcement is to remain lawful, it should be accompanied by:

Without these safeguards, DNS blocklists become tools for scope creep and collateral censorship, harming legitimate operators and creating compliance nightmares for hosting and DNS infrastructure providers.